Donnellan (1966) says, "Using a definite description referentially a speaker may say something true even though the description correctly applies to nothing" (p. 298). His example—taken from Linsky (1963)—has someone saying of a spinster: [o vi mi powco]

Her husband is kind to her.

After having had Mr. Jones—actually the spinster's brother—misintroduced as the spinster's husband. And—to fill it out—having noticed Jones' solicitous attention to his sister, The speaker used the nonnondenoting description 'Her husband' to refer to Mr. Jones. And so, what he said was true.

There are a lot of entities associated with the utterance of 'Her husband is kind to her' which are commonly said to have been said: tokens, types, sentences, propositions, statements, etc. The something-true-said, Donnellan calls a statement.

On the other hand, "If... the speaker has just met the lady and, noticing her cheerfulness and radiant good health, made his remark from his conviction that these attributes are always the result of having good husbands, he would be using the definite description attributively" (p. 299).

After pointing out that "in general, whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attributively is a function of the speaker's intentions in a particular case," (p. 297) he mentions that according to Russell's theory of descriptions, the use of the & might be thought of as involving reference "in a very weak sense... to whatever is the one and only one &; if there is any such." (p. 303). Donnellan then concludes:

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Do not partake of this article before reading the Warning on page 242.
Now this is something we might well say about the attributive use of definite descriptions... But this lack of particularity is absent from the referential use of definite descriptions precisely because the description is here merely a device for getting one’s audience to pick out or think of the thing to be spoken about, a device which may serve its function even if the description is incorrect. More importantly perhaps, in the referential use as opposed to the attributive, there is a right thing to be picked out by the audience, and its being the right thing is not simply a function of its fitting the description (p. 303).

Donnellan develops his theory by adducing a series of quite plausible examples to help him answer certain theoretical questions, e.g. Are there sentences in which the contained definite description can only be used referentially (or only attributively), Can reference fail when a definite description is used referentially?, etc.

In my own reading and rereading of Donnellan’s article I always find it both fascinating and maddening. Fascinating, because the fundamental distinction so clearly reflects an accurate insight into language use, and maddening, because: First, the examples seem to me to alternate between at least two clearly discriminable concepts of referential use; second, the notion of having someone in mind is not analyzed but used; and third, the connections with the developed body of knowledge concerning intensional logics—their syntax and semantics—are not explicitly made, so we cannot immediately see what Donnellan and intensional logic have to offer each other, if anything.

As one of the body developers, I find this last snub especially inexcusable. This is not a divergent perception for those of my ilk. Hintikka remarks (plaintively), “The only thing I miss in Donnellan’s excellent paper is a clear realization that the distinction he is talking about is only operative in contexts governed by propositional attitudes or other modal terms” (1967:47).

Hintikka’s remark is at first surprising, since none of Donnellan’s examples seem to have this form. But the remark falls into place when we recognize that Donnellan is concerned essentially with a given speaker who is asserting something, asking something, or commanding something. And thus if we pull back and focus our attention on the sentence describing the speech act:

John asserted that Mary’s husband is kind to her.

the intensional operator appears.

Probably Hintikka wanted to argue that the sentence:

Her husband is kind to her.

is not itself ambiguous in the way that, say:

Every boy kissed a girl.

is. The fact that an ambiguous sentence is produced by embedding a in some sentential context (for example, an intensional or temporal operator) should not be construed to indicate an ambiguity in a. For were it so, (almost?) all sentences would be ambiguous.

Donnellan’s distinction is a contribution to the reversion of an old and common-sensical theory about language which—at least in the philosophical literature—has rather been in a decline during the ascendancy of semantics over epistemology of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. The commonsense theory is one that Russell wrestled with in Principles of Mathematics (1903) but seemed to reject in “On Denoting” (1905). This theory asserts roughly that the correct analysis of a typical speech act, for example:

John is tall.

distinguishes who is being talked about, i.e. the individual under consideration—here, John—from how he is being characterized—here, as tall.

Russell’s analysis of the proposition expressed by

John is tall.

provides it with two components: the property expressed by the predicate ‘is tall’, and the individual John. That’s right, John himself, right there, trapped in a proposition.

During the Golden Age of Pure Semantics we were developing a nice homogeneous theory, with language, meanings, and entities of the world each properly segregated and related one to another in rather smooth and comfortable ways. This development probably came to its peak in Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity (1947). Each designator has both an intension and an extension. Sentences have truth values as extensions and propositions as intentions, predicates have classes as extensions and properties as intensions, terms have individuals as extensions and individual concepts as intensions, and so on. The intension of a compound is a function of the intensions of the parts and similarly the extension (except when intensional operators appear). There is great beauty and power in this theory.

But there remained some nagging doubts: proper names, demonstratives, and quantification into intensional contexts.
Proper names may be a practical convenience in our mundane transactions, but they are a theoretician's nightmare. They are like bicycles. Everyone easily learns to ride, but no one can correctly explain how he does it. Completely new theories have been proposed within the last few years, in spite of the fact that the subject has received intense attention throughout this century, and in some portions of Tibet people have had proper names for even longer than that.

The main difficulty has to do, I believe, with the special intimate relationship between a proper name and its bearer. Russell said that in contrast with a common noun, like 'unicorn', a proper name means what it names. And if it names nothing, it means nothing. In the case of 'unicorn' we have a meaning, perhaps better a descriptive meaning, which we make use of in looking for such things. But in the case of the name 'Moravcsik' there is just Moravcsik. There is no basis on which to ask whether Moravcsik exists. Such a question is—for Russell—meaningless. But people persist in asking this question. Maybe not this very question, but analogous ones like:

Does Santa Claus exist?

There were other apparent difficulties in Russell's theory. The astronomical discovery that Hesperus was identical with Phosphorus became a triviarity. The sentence expressing it expressed the same proposition as 'Hesperus is identical with Hesperus'. Furthermore, although the bearer of given proper name is the be-all and end-all of the name's semantic relata, almost every proper name has dozens of bearers.

And then there are the unforgivable distortions of the minimal descriptive content of proper names. We all know of butchers named 'Baker' and dogs named 'Sir Walter'. The ultimate in such perversity occurs in titles of the top administrative officers at UCLA. We have four vice-chancellors at UCLA, one of whom has the title 'The Vice-Chancellor'.

All in all, proper names are a mess and if it weren't for the problem of how to get the kids to come in for dinner, I'd be inclined to just junk them.

At any rate, the attempt during the Golden Age was to whip proper names into line. In fact into the line of common nouns. People do ask:

Does Santa Claus exist?

So that must mean something like:

Does a unicorn exist?

They do ask:

Is Hesperus identical to Phosphorus?

DTTHAT

So that must mean something like:

Are bachelors identical with college graduates?

Thus was waged a war of attrition against proper names. Many were unmasked as disguised descriptions, e.g. 'Aristotle' means the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander whom...—not an unreasonable proposal.

However, some of these expositions did seem a bit oppressive, e.g. Russell's suggestion that:

Scott is Sir Walter.

really means:

The person named 'Scott' is the person named 'Sir Walter'.

followed by his nonchalant remark: 'This is a way in which names are frequently used in practice, and there will, as a rule, be nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names' (1920:474). But at least they isolated the few real trouble-makers—who turned out not to be our good old proper names at all but a handful of determined outside demonstratives: 'this', 'that', etc.

In summary, the technique was first to expose a proper name as a disguised description (sometimes on tenuous and unreliable evidence) and then ruthlessly to eliminate it.

We thus reduce the exciting uncertainties of:

Socrates is a man.

to the banality of:

All men are mortal.

The demonstratives were still there, but they were so gross they could be ignored.

Lately, under the pressure of the new interest in singular propositions generated by intensional logic, the verities of the Golden Age are breaking down. Once logicians became interested in formalizing a logic of necessity, belief, knowledge, assertion, etc., traditional syntactical ways quickly led to formulas like

John asserted that \( x \) is a spy.

with free '\( x \)' and then with '\( x \)' bound to an anterior operator. Under what
circumstances does a given individual, taken as value of 'x', satisfy this
could be? Answer: If the appropriate singular proposition was the content of
John's assertive utterance.

It seems that in at least certain speech acts, what I am trying to express
can't quite be put into words. It is that proposition of Russell's with John
trapped in it.

The property of being tall is exactly expressed by 'is tall', and the concept
of the unique spy who is shorter than all other spies is exactly expressed by
'the shortest spy'; but no expression exactly expresses John. An expression
can express a concept or property that, in reality, only John satisfies. There
are many such distinct concepts; none of which is John himself.

I would like to distinguish between the kind of propositions which were
considered by Aristotle (all S is P, some S is not P, etc.) and the kind of
proposition considered by the early Russell. I call the former general propo-
sitions and the latter singular propositions. Suppose, just for definiteness,
that we fix attention on sentences of simple subject-predicate form. The
following are examples:

(1) A spy is suspicious.
(2) Every spy is suspicious.
(3) The spy is suspicious.
(4) John is suspicious.

Now let us think of the proposition associated with each sentence as having
two components. Corresponding to the predicate we have the property of
being suspicious; and corresponding to the subject we have either what
Russell in 1903 called a denoting concept or an individual. Let us take the
proposition to be the ordered couple of these two components.

Again, to fix ideas, let us provide a possible-world style of interpretation
for these notions. We think of each total or complete possible state of affairs
as a possible world. The possible worlds are each continuants through time
and may in fact overlap at certain times. For example, a possible world may
agree with the actual world up to the time at which some individual made a
particular decision; the possible world may then represent an outcome of a
decision other than the one actually taken. (In science fiction, such cases are
called alternate time lines.)

Within this framework we can attempt to represent a number of the
semantic notions in question. We might represent the property of being
suspicious by that function P which assigns to each possible world w and
each t the set of all those individuals of w which, in w, are suspicious at

It should be clear that each of (5)-(7) will determine a function which assigns
to each possible world w and time t a truth value. And in fact the truth value
so assigned to any w and t will be exactly the truth value in w at t of the

1 Both 'denoting concept' and 'denoting phrase' are Russell's terms used in Russell's way.
proposition expressed by (4) which is, in a sense, formally equivalent to (8) and which blurs the distinction I wish to emphasize. I do it now lest anyone think that the possibility is a relevant refutation of my later remarks. Let us clearly depart from Russell by associating a denoting concept:

\[(\text{\textquoteleft Proper Name\textquoteright, } J)\]

where \(J\) is what we might call John's essence, the property of being John, namely, that function which assigns to each possible world \(w\) and time \(t\) the set \{John\} if John is an individual of \(w\) and is alive in \(w\) at \(t\) and the empty set otherwise. The analogue to (8) is now

\[(\text{\textquoteleft Proper Name\textquoteright, } J \uparrow P)\]

It will be noted that we have now treated the proper name 'John' rather like the definite description 'The John', in which the proper name plays the role of a common noun. Accordingly the function from possible worlds and times to truth values which is determined by (10) is identical with that determined by:

\[(\text{\textquoteleft The\textquoteright, } J \uparrow P)\]

There are certainly other representations of these propositions which ally various subgroups. In fact, once any formal structure is established, the production of isomorphic structures satisfying specified "internal" conditions is largely a matter of logical ingenuity of the "pure" kind.²

To return to the point, I have represented propositions in a way which emphasizes the singular-general distinction, because I want to revive a view of language alternate to that of the Golden Age. The view of the Golden Age is, I believe, undoubtedly correct for a large portion of language behavior, in particular, communication by means of general propositions. But the alternate view accounts for a portion of language behavior not accommodated by the view of the Golden Age.

The alternate view is: that some or all of the denoting phrases used in an utterance should not be considered part of the content of what is said but should rather be thought of as contextual factors which help us to interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain content. The most typical of such contextual factors is the fact that the speaker's utterance is to be

² An example is the possibility of producing set theoretical representations of the system of natural numbers which make all even numbers alike in certain set theoretical features, (distinct from such numerical features as divisibility by two) and all odd numbers alike in other set theoretical features, or which provide simple and elegant definitions (i.e., representations) of certain basic numerical operations and relations such as less than or plus, etc.
connection with *demonstratives*: this', this spy', that book', etc. In at least some typical uses of these phrases, it is required that the utterance be accompanied by a *demonstration*—paradigmatically, a pointing—which indicates the object for which the phrase stands. I will speak of a *demonstrative use* of a singular denoting phrase when the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration.

Now we can add another example of a subject-predicate sentence to those of (1)-(4):

(12) He [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.

I am adopting the convention of enclosing a description of the relevant demonstration in square brackets immediately following each denoting phrase which is used demonstratively.

What shall we take as the proposition corresponding to (12) (which I also call the *content of the utterance* (12))? In line with our program of studying contextual factors which are not part of what is said but whose role is rather to help us interpret the utterance as having a certain content, we shall take the component of the proposition which corresponds to the demonstrative to be the individual demonstrated. Thus the varying *forms* which such a demonstration can take are not reflected in the content of the utterance (i.e. the proposition). The demonstration "gives us" the element of the proposition corresponding to the demonstrative. But *how* the demonstration gives that individual to us is here treated as irrelevant to the content of the utterance; just as the different ways by which I might have come to understand which Jordan was relevant to my wife's utterance, or the different ways by which one might come to understand that a speaker is speaking Knob rather than English, do not alter the content of those utterances. Thus, for example, the utterances (in English):

*The question of whether all uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations depends on a number of factors, some empirical, some stipulative, and some in the twilight zone of theoretical ingenuity. The stipulative question is whether we use "demonstrative" to describe certain phrases which might also be described by enumeration or some syntactical device, e.g. all phrases beginning with either "this" or "that" and followed by a common noun phrase; or whether we use "demonstrative" to describe a certain characteristic use of such phrases. In the latter case it may be stipulatively true that an utterance containing a demonstrative must be accompanied by a demonstration. In the former case, the question turns both on how people in fact speak and on how clever our theoretician is in producing recherché demonstrations to account for apparent counterexamples.

*This formulation probably needs sharpening. Don't take it as a definition.

It should not be supposed that my practice indicates any confidence as to the nature and structure of what I call *demonstrations* or the proper form for a *demonstration-description* to take. Indeed, these are difficult and important questions which arise repeatedly in what follows.

(13) He [the speaker points at John, as John stands on the demonstration platform nude, clean shaven, and bathed in light] is suspicious.

(14) He [the speaker points at John, as John lurks in shadows wearing a trenchcoat, bearded, with his hat pulled down over his face] is suspicious.

are taken, along with other refinements of (12), as expressing the same proposition, namely:

(15) \(\langle \text{John,} P \rangle\).

It should immediately be apparent that we are in store for some delightful anomalies. Erroneous beliefs may lead a speaker to put on a demonstration which does not demonstrate what he thinks it does, with the result that he will be under a misapprehension as to what he has said. Utterances of identity sentences containing one or more demonstratives may express necessary propositions, though neither the speaker nor his auditors are aware of it. In fact, we get extreme cases in which linguistic competence is simply insufficient to completely determine the content of what is said. Of course this was already established by the case of the Knob-English translation problem, but the situation is more dramatic using the demonstratives.

The present treatment is not inevitable. An alternative is to incorporate the demonstration in the proposition. We would argue as follows: Frege's (1892) *sense and denotation* distinction can be extended to all kinds of indicative devices. In each case we have the object indicated (the "denotation") and the manner of indication (the "sense"). It is interesting to note that (at least in Feigl's translation) Frege wrote of "the sense (comnotation, meaning) of the sign in which is contained the *manner and context of presentation of the denotation of the sign" (Frege 1892). I think it reasonable to interpret Frege as saying that the sense of a sign is what is grasped by the linguistically competent auditor, and it seems natural to generalize and say that it is the "sense" of the demonstration that is grasped by the competent auditor of utterances containing demonstratives. Thus we see how the drawn-out English utterance:

(16) That [the speaker points at Phosphorus in early morning] is the same planet as that [the speaker points at Hesperus in early evening].

could be both informative and true.

7 From "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (emphasis added).
Let us call the preceding a Fregean treatment of demonstratives. It is worth developing (which means primarily working on the ontology (metaphysics?)) of demonstrations and the semantics of demonstration descriptions but, I believe, will ultimately be unsatisfactory. For now I’ll just outline some of the reasons. The demonstrative use of demonstratives plays an important role in language learning, in general, in the learning and use of proper names, in our misty use of de re modalities, in our better grounded use of what Quine (1955) calls the relational senses of epistemic verbs (i.e., the senses of those intensional verbs that permit quantification). And, in general, I believe that we can sharpen our epistemological insights in a number of areas by taking account of what I call the demonstrative use of expression. Such uses are far more widespread than one imagined.

I earlier called the Fregean treatment of demonstratives “unsatisfactory.” I would be more cautious in saying that it was wrong. (Though I do think an empirical argument from linguistic behavior could be developed to show that it is wrong. I take Donnellan’s study of the phenomenology of what he calls referential use to be an excellent start in that direction.) What I am confident of is that if we force all phenomena that suggest a special demonstrative use of language, along with what I regard as a corresponding feature—a special singular form of proposition—into the Fregean mold of linguistic elements with a sense and a denotation, the sense being the element which appears in the proposition (thus leaving us with only general propositions), then important insights will be lost. I don’t deny that on a phenomenon-by-phenomenon basis we can (in some sense) keep stretching Frege’s brilliant insights to cover. With a little ingenuity I think we can do that. But we shouldn’t.

Now let me offer a slightly different and somewhat a priori justification for studying the phenomena of demonstrative uses of expressions and singular propositions. I leave aside the question of whether we have correctly analyzed any actual linguistic behavior, whether concerned with the so-called demonstrative phrases or otherwise.

Having explained so clearly and precisely what such a use of language would amount to, in terms of a possible-world semantics, I can simply resolve to so use the word ‘that’ in the future. At a minimum I could introduce the new word ‘dthat’ for the demonstrative use of ‘that’. Couldn’t I? I can, and I will. In fact, I do.

I like this intentional (i.e., stipulative) way of looking at the use of ‘dthat’ because I believe that in many cases where there are competing Fregean and demonstrative analyses of some utterances or class of utterances the matter can be resolved simply by the intentions of the speaker (appropriately conveyed to the auditor?). Thus in the case of proper names (to which I will return below) I might simply resolve to use them demonstratively (i.e., as demonstrating the individual whom they are a name of, in the nomenclature of an earlier paper (Kaplan 1968)°, on certain occasions and in a Fregean way° on other occasions. Of course one who did not have a clear understanding of the alternatives might have difficulty in characterizing his own use, but once we have explored each choice there is nothing to prevent us from choosing either, “unnatural” though the choice may be.

It should probably be noted that despite the accessibility of the semantics of ‘dthat’ our grasp of the singular propositions so expressed is, in John Perry’s apt phrase, a bit of knowledge by description as compared with our rather more direct acquaintance with the general propositions expressed by nondemonstrative utterances.

Armed with ‘dthat’ we can now explore and possibly even extend the frontiers of demonstrations.

When we considered the Fregean analysis of demonstrations, we attempted to establish parallels between demonstrations and descriptions. Insofar as this aspect of the Fregean program is successful, it suggests the possibility of a demonstrative analysis of descriptions. If pointing can be taken as a form of describing, then why not take describing as a form of pointing? Note that our demonstrative analysis of demonstrations need not, indeed should not, deny or even ignore the fact that demonstrations have both a sense and a demonstration. It is just that according to the demonstrative analysis the sense of the demonstration does not appear in the proposition. Instead the sense is used only to fix the demonstration which itself appears directly in the proposition. I propose now to do the same for descriptions. Instead of taking the sense of the description as subject of the proposition, we use the sense only to fix the denotation which we then take directly as subject component of the proposition. I now take the utterance of the description as a demonstration and describe it with the usual quotation devices, thus:

(17) Dthat ['the spy'] is suspicious.

I will attempt below to press the case that this use of proper names, which involves no waving of hands or fixing of glance, may be assimilated to the more traditional forms of demonstrative use.°°°°° In the case of genuinely proper names like ‘Aristotle’ opinions as regards their sense may diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested: Plato’s disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great. Whoever accepts this sense will interpret the meaning of the statement ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’ differently from one who interpreted the sense of ‘Aristotle’ as the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great’ (from Feigl’s translation of Frege’s “Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung”).

A third kind of indicative device is the picture. Consideration of pictures, which to me lie somewhere between pointing and describing, may help to drive home the parallels—in terms of the distinction between the object indicated and the manner of indication—between description, depiction, and demonstration.
For fixity of ideas, let us suppose, what is surely false, that in fact, actuality, and reality, there is one and only one spy, and John is he. We might express this so:

(18) "the spy" denotes John.\(^{11}\)

In the light of (18), (17) expresses:

(19) (John, P)
(also known as '(8) and '(15)').

Recollecting and collecting we have:

(3) The spy is suspicious.
(4) John is suspicious.
(7) ("The", S) P
(12) He [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.
or, as we might now write (12):

(20) Dhe [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.\(^{12}\)

Earlier we said that an utterance of (3) expresses (7), and only an utterance of (12) [i.e. (20)] or possibly (4) expresses (19). I have already suggested that an utterance of (4) may sometimes be taken in a Fregean way to express something like (7), and now I want to point out that for want of 'dthat' some speakers may be driven to utter (3) when they intend what is expressed by (17).

If an utterance of (3) may indeed sometimes express (19), then Donnellan was essentially correct in describing his referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions as a "duality of function." And it might even be correct to describe this duality as an ambiguity in the sentence type (3). I should note right here that my demonstrative use is not quite Donnellan's referential use—a deviation that I will expatiate on below—but it is close enough for present purposes.

\(^{11}\) That all utterances are in English is a general and implicit assumption except where it is explicitly called into question.

\(^{12}\) 'Dhe' is really a combination of the demonstrative with a common noun phrase. It stands for 'dthat male.' More on such combinations below.

The ambiguity in question here is of a rather special kind. For under no circumstances could the choice of disambiguation for an utterance of (3) affect the truth value. Still there are two distinct propositions involved, and even two distinct functions from possible worlds and times to truth values, determined by the two propositions.

Before continuing with the ambiguity in (3), it would be well to interject some remarks on sentence types and sentence tokens (of which utterances are one kind) especially as they relate to demonstratives.

Sentences types vary considerably in the degree to which they contain implicit and explicit references to features of the context of utterance. The references I have in mind here are those which affect the truth value of the sentence type on a particular occasion of utterance. At one extreme stand what Quine (in *Word and Object*) called eternal sentences: those in which the feature linguists call tense does not really reflect a perspective from some point in time, which contain no indexicals such as "now", "here", "I", etc., and whose component names and definite descriptions are not understood to require contextual determination as did the "Jordan" of our earlier example. Quine describes such sentences as "those whose truth value stays fixed through time and from speaker to speaker." (1960: 193) But I prefer my own vaguer formulation: _those sentences which do not express a perspective from within space-time_. Quine and I would both count 'In 1970 American women exceed American men in wealth' as eternal; he would (presumably) also count 'The UCLA football team always has, does, and will continue to outclass the Stanford football team' as eternal. I would not.

Truth values are awarded directly to eternal sentences without any relativization to time, place, etc.\(^{13}\) But for the fugitive sentence no stable truth value can be awarded. Let us consider first tensed sentences, e.g.:

(21) American men will come to exceed American women in intelligence.

Without disputing the facts, if (21) were true at one time, it would fail to be true at some later time. (Since one doesn't come to exceed what one already exceeds.)

Now let's dredge up the possible worlds. We associated with (21) a function which assigns to each possible world and time a truth value. Such a

\(^{13}\) There are, of course, two hidden relativizations involved even for eternal sentences. One is to a language, i.e. an association of meanings with words. The Knob—English example was meant to dramatize this relativization. The other is to a possible world. There is always the implicit reference to the actual world when we just use the expression 'true'. If the analogy between moments of time and possible world holds—as some philosophers think—then maybe we should begin our classification of sentences not with explicitly dated eternal sentences like 'in 1970 . . .', but with 'perfect' sentences like 'In the possible world Charlie in 1970 . . .'.

function seems to represent, for reasons which have been much discussed, at least part of the meaning of (21) or part of what we grasp when we understand (21). There is another kind of 'content' associated with a fugitive sentence like (21), namely, the content of a particular utterance of (21). In a sense, any particular utterance (token) of a fugitive sentence (type) is an eternalization of the fugitive sentence. The relativization to time is fixed by the time of utterance. We can associate with each utterance of a fugitive sentence the same kind of function from possible worlds to truth values that we associate directly with eternal sentences.

Before becoming completely lost in a vague nomenclature, let me make some stipulations. I will call the function which assigns to a time and a possible world the truth value of a given fugitive sentence (type) at that time in that world the meaning of the given sentence. The meaning of a sentence is what a person who is linguistically competent grasps, it is common to all utterances of the sentence, and it is one of the components which goes into determining the content of any particular utterance of the sentence. The content of an utterance is that function which assigns to each possible world the truth value which the utterance would take if it were evaluated with respect to that world. There is some unfortunate slack in the preceding characterizations, which I will try to reduce.

Let $\emptyset$ be a fugitive sentence like (21); let $\emptyset$ be the meaning of $\emptyset$, let $W$ be the set of possible worlds; let $T$ be the set of times (I assume that all possible worlds have the same temporal structure and, in fact, the very same times, i.e. a given time in one world has a unique counterpart in all others); let $U$ be the set of possible utterances; for $u \in U$, let $S(u)$ be the sentence uttered in $u$; let $T(u)$ be the time of $u$ (when only $S(u)$ and $T(u)$ are relevant; we might identify $u$ with $\langle S(u), T(u) \rangle$ and let $u$ be the content of $u$. The relation between the meaning of a sentence (whose only fugitive aspect is its temporality) and the content of one of its possible utterances can now be concisely expressed as follows:

$\forall u \in U \forall w \in W \big( \langle S(u), T(u) \rangle = S(u) \big( T(u), w \big) \big)$

or, identifying $u$ with $\langle S(u), T(u) \rangle$:

$\forall w \in W \forall t \in T \big( \langle \emptyset, t \rangle(w) = \emptyset(t, w) \big)$

To put it another way, an utterance of $\emptyset$ fixes a time, and the content of the

utterance takes account of the truth value of $\emptyset$ in all possible worlds but only at that time.

From (22) and (23) it would appear that the notions of meaning and content are interdefinable. Therefore, since we already have begun developing the theory of meaning for fugitive sentences (see especially the work of Montague), why devote any special attention to the theory of content? Is it not simply a subtheory of a definitional extension of the theory of meaning? I think not. But the reasons go beyond simple examples like (21) and take us, hopefully, back to the main track of this paper. It is worth looking more deeply into the structure of utterances than a simple definition of that notion within the theory of meaning would suggest. (I stress simple because I have not yet really investigated sophisticated definitions.)

First we have problems about the counterfactual status of possible utterances. Are utterances in worlds, are they assumed to occur in worlds in which their content is being evaluated, or are they extraworldly, with their content evaluated independent of their occurrence? Consider the infamous 'I am here now', or perhaps more simply:

(24) 

... An utterance is occurring.

Is the meaning of (24) to assign to a time and world the truth value which an utterance of (24) would take were it to occur in that world at that time? Or does it assign simply the truth value of (24) in that world at that time? Presumably the latter. But this is to assume that utterances come complete, with the value of all of their contextually determined features filled in (otherwise the utterance alone—without being set in a world—would not have a content). I do not want to make this assumption since I am particularly interested in the way in which a demonstration, for example, picks out its demonstratum.

And now we are back to the ambiguity in (3). I would like to count my verbal demonstration, as in (17), as part of the sentence type. Then it seems that an utterance of such a sentence either must include a world, or else, what is more plausible, must be in a world. I guess what I want to say, what I should have said, is that an utterance has to occur somewhere, in some world, and the world in which it occurs is a crucial factor in determining what the content is. This really says something about how (I think) I want to treat (possible) demonstrations. I want the same (possible) demonstrations (e.g. ['the spy']) to determine different demonstrata in different worlds (or possibly even at different times in the same world). Now I see why I was so taken with the Fregean treatment of demonstrations. We should be able to
represent demonstrations as something like functions from worlds, times, etc., to demonstrata. Thus, just like the meaning of a definite description. The difference lies in how the content of a particular utterance is computed.

I realize that the foregoing is mildly inconsistent, but let us push on. Let \( u \) be an utterance of (17) in \( w \) at \( t \), and let \( u' \) be an utterance of (3) in \( w \) at \( t \). Let's not worry, for now, about the possibility of a clash of utterances. If we look at the content of \( u \) and the content of \( u' \) we will see that they differ—though they will always agree in \( w \). The content of \( u \) is like what I earlier called a singular proposition (except that I should have fixed the time), whereas the content of \( u' \) is like what I earlier called a general proposition. For the content of \( u \) to assign truth to a given world \( w' \), the individual who must be suspicious in \( w' \) at \( t \) is not the denotation of 'the spy' in \( w' \) at \( t \), but rather the denotation of 'the spy' in \( w \) at \( t \). The relevant individual is determined in the world in which the utterance takes place, and then that same individual is checked for suspicion in all other worlds, whereas for the content of \( u' \), we determine a (possibly) new relevant individual in each world.\(^{11}\)

What is especially interesting is that these two contents must agree in the world \( w' \), the world in which the utterance took place.

Now note that the verbal form of (3) might have been adopted by one who lacked 'dthat' to express what is expressed by (17). We seem to have here a kind of de dicto - de re ambiguity in the verbal form of (3) and without benefit of any intensional operator. No question of an utterer's intentions have been brought into play. There is no question of an analysis in terms of scope, since there is no operator. The two sentence types (3) and (17) are such that when uttered in the same context they have different contents but always the same truth value where uttered. Donnellan vindicated! (Contrary to my own earlier expectations.)

I am beginning to suspect that I bungled things even worse than I thought in talking about meanings, contents, etc. The meaning of a sentence type should probably be a function from utterances to contents rather than from something like utterances to truth values. If this correction were made, then we could properly say that (13) and (17) differ in meaning.

It would also give a more satisfactory analysis of a sentence type like:

\[
(25) \quad \text{dthat ['the morning star']} \text{ is identical with dthat ['the evening star']}.
\]

Although it expresses a true content on some possible occasions of use and a false content on others, it is not simply contingent, since on all possible occasions its content is either necessary or impossible. (I am assuming that distinct individuals don't merge.) Even one who grasped the meaning of (25) would not of course know its truth value simply on witnessing an utterance. Thus we answer the question of how an utterance of an identity sentence can be informative through necessary!

Another example on the question of necessity. Suppose I now utter:

\[
(26) \quad \text{I am more than thirty-six years old}.
\]

What I have said is true. Is it necessary? This may be arguable. (Could I be younger than I am at this very same time?) But the fact that the sentence, if uttered at an earlier time or by another person, could express something false is certainly irrelevant. The point is: to simply look at the spectrum of truth values of different utterances of (25) and (26) and not at the spectrum of contents of different utterances of (25) and (26) is to miss something interesting and important.

I earlier said that my demonstrative use is not quite Donnellan's referential use, and I want now to return to that point. When a speaker uses an expression demonstratively he usually has in mind—so to speak—an intended demonstratum, and the demonstration is thus teleological. Donnellan and I disagree on how to bring the intended demonstratum into the picture. To put it crudely, Donnellan believes that for most purposes we should take the demonstratum to be the intended demonstratum. I believe that these are different notions that may well involve different objects.

From my point of view the situation is interesting precisely because we have a case here in which a person can fail to say what he intended to say, and the failure is not a linguistic error (such as using the wrong word) but a factual one. It seems to me that such a situation can arise only in the demonstrative mode.

Suppose that without turning and looking I point to the place on my wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolf Carnap and I say:

\[
(27) \quad \text{dthat [I point as above] is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century}.
\]

But unbeknownst to me, someone has replaced my picture of Carnap with one of Spiro Agnew. I think it would simply be wrong to argue an 'ambiguity' in the demonstration, so great that it can be bent to my intended demonstratum. I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation to the linguistically competent public observer.
10. Demonstratives, dubbings, definitions, and other forms of language learning. Common nouns: what they mean and how we learn it. This section will include such pontifications as the following:

It is a mistake to believe that normal communication takes place through the encoding and decoding of general propositions, by means of our grasp of meanings. It is a more serious mistake, because more pernicious, to believe that other aspects of communication can be accounted for by a vague reference to "contextual features" of the utterance. Indeed, we first learn the meanings of almost all parts of our language by means quite different from those of the formal definitions studied in metamathematics; and the means used for first teaching the meanings of words, rather than withering away, are regularly and perhaps even essentially employed thereafter in all forms of communication.

WARNING

This paper was prepared for and read at the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics. Peter Cole has persuaded me—against my better judgment—that it has aged long enough to be digestible. The paper has not been revised other than to remove the subtitle comment "'Stream of Consciousness Draft: Errors, confusions and disorganizations are not to be taken seriously.'" That injunction must still be strictly obeyed. Some parts of this ramble are straightened out in the excessive refinements of "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice" (which appeared in the proceedings for which this was destined; Hintikka et al., 1973). A more direct presentation of the resulting theory along with some of its applications is to be found in Kaplan (1977).

"DTTHAT" is pronounced as a single syllable.

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REFERENCES
